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
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report

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Intellectual Dissent in the USSR

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INTELLECTUAL DISSENT IN THE USSR

The inability of the collective leadership to solve many of the domestic problems of the Soviet Union and its rejection of any dilution of the party's monopoly in decision-making have resulted in increased disaffection among the liberal, reform-oriented intelligentsia. Neo-Stalinism and repression have in many cases turned disaffection into dissidence. The dissidents appear to have two principal objectives: some demand strict adherence to the constitution; others are focusing on formulating an alternative to the present system. The increased political nature of dissent in the Soviet Union is in part a consequence of the dampening of hopes raised by Khrushchev's liberalization program, leading many of the intelligentsia to believe that intellectual freedom and individual rights are impossible without a change in the political structure.

Finding it increasingly difficult to publish more than ambiguous criticism in approved journals, the dissidents have turned to *samizdat*, the underground press, to disseminate their ideas. *Samizdat* itself has changed, reflecting the alteration in the attitudes of the dissident intelligentsia. It has become more substantive and polemical than it was under Khrushchev, suggesting that the dissidents realize that they constitute a movement. One of the most significant developments in *samizdat* has been the appearance of political programs advocating democratization of the Soviet political structure. Although the programs are not likely to attract popular support, they do reflect the growing sophistication and political awareness of the intelligentsia.

Thus far, the regime has found a policy of selective repression effective in keeping dissidence in check. In contrast with the embarrassing trials of the mid-60s, the authorities now prefer to try dissidents in the provinces or, more frequently, to isolate them by confining them to psychiatric institutes. In addition, less sensational measures such as expulsion from the party, loss of jobs, and pressure from professional organizations have been effective in deterring some from joining the dissidents.

By no means all of the intelligentsia have been infected. Conservatives among them share the regime's "siege mentality" and consequently favor suppression of the liberal viewpoint. By virtue of their domination of professional organizations such as the Writers' Union, the conservatives have been able to demonstrate their orthodoxy by expelling or censuring their too liberal colleagues. The conservatives have on occasion, however, been rebuked for their extremist views, most recently on Russian nationalism and "vigilance" against contamination by Western ideas.

Because the fundamental cause of disaffection and dissidence is the reluctance of the party to share its monopoly of the decision-making process, it is likely that both will continue to trouble the government. The current leadership, however, apparently sees no threat to its stability in the present manifestations of dissidence. Barring the development of revolutionary tendencies among the dissenters, the regime will probably continue its present policy of selective repression. If dissidence should become a threat, the regime can be expected to move quickly and decisively to suppress it.

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The Soviet Intelligentsia

In the Soviet Union, the term intelligentsia is loosely used to designate those engaged in non-physical labor. Traditionally, however, the term referred to that group in Russian society with a reputation for critical and independent thought. Using the more restricted, historical definition, the term and the connotation of political opposition long associated with it are applicable to those elements who want change in the Soviet society. By its very nature, the Soviet power structure is closed and unresponsive to movement for reform originating outside the system. The intelligentsia's opposition stems from a sense of frustration caused by this situation rather than from revolutionary zeal. The tendency of the dissidents to refer to the party and government as "they" (in a "we-they" context) is a manifestation of their sense of alienation.

Economically, socially, and professionally, the disaffected intelligentsia are a heterogeneous group including academic figures, social scientists, artists, writers, managers, and economists. Yet, in spite of their diversity and the absence of a formalized organization, they exhibit a remarkable degree of cohesion.

These dissidents can be identified by their opposition to neo-Stalinism (a return to the old ways of doing things), and to suppression of intellectual freedom and free discussion (*glasnost*) and by their support for a value system based on efficiency rather than ideological orthodoxy.

The intelligentsia can be subdivided into several groups. The creative intelligentsia, composed mainly of people in the liberal arts professions and the social sciences and the "professional" intelligentsia, which includes scientists, engineers, economists, and similar professions, are the two major subdivisions. The radical intelligentsia and the religious and nationalist dissidents, whose educational level is less homogeneous, cut across social classes and groupings. Despite the diversity of these groups and their lack of formal organiza-

tion, their various interests do overlap, and they support each other on occasion.

The Creative Intelligentsia

The most visible and apparently the largest disaffected group embraces the liberal members of the creative intelligentsia. It is composed primarily of writers and of academics in the liberal arts and social sciences, but it also includes students in these disciplines, some religious dissidents, such as Anatoly Levitin-Krasnov, and representatives of the performing and graphic arts. The creative intelligentsia in the 1950s and early 1960s sought the revitalization of Soviet culture, which was still suffering from the inhibitions imposed during the Stalin years and from socialist realism's domination of aesthetics. Although the movement for aesthetic freedom is still important to members of this grouping, the reimposition of many of the old standards of orthodoxy since Khrushchev's ouster has perforce shifted their focus away from aesthetic values and toward the political mechanism that thwarts them.

Not all of the creative intelligentsia can be categorized as dissidents. There is a conservative element that shares the regime's view that the "ideological conflict" with the West creates a special need for loyalty and conformity on the part of all, leaving no room for individuality. The conservatives, having roots in Russian history as strong as those of their liberal opponents, are not mere opportunists in spite of the coincidence of their views with those of the regime. *Mutatis mutandis*, the conservatives are very similar to their nineteenth century predecessors in their belief that Russia has something unique to offer mankind. Consequently, they oppose any perversion of Russia's virtues with ideas and attitudes transplanted from the West. In fact, harking back to the nineteenth century, manifestations of this attitude in the Soviet Union have been characterized as neo-Slavophile.

Like the nineteenth century intelligentsia, both groups use literary journals to disseminate

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their views. *Oktyabr*, edited by Vsevolod Kochetov, expresses the conservative position, and *Novy Mir*, until recently under Aleksandr Tvardovsky's editorship, represents the liberal viewpoint. By virtue of their support for the status quo, the conservatives have an advantage, and the February purge of *Novy Mir's* editorial board suggests that their influence will continue strong.

The "Professional" Intelligentsia

The liberal "professional" intelligentsia is composed primarily of scientists and engineers but also includes some economists and members of the "managerial class." The dominant characteristic of this group is pragmatism. The scientists and engineers want freer association with Western colleagues and freer exchange of ideas. They oppose the injection of ideology into scientific research and debate. Although the economists and managers share these views, their pragmatism is often more narrowly focused. Efficiency, especially in the economic sector, is the primary issue. They too oppose the dominant, and stultifying, influence of ideology in economic affairs.

The liberal "professionals" argue that a system of material incentives offers a more effective way to stimulate and control the economy than reliance either on propaganda or administrative fiat. They propose extension of the Kosygin reforms, more enterprise autonomy, decentralization of the supply system, and the development of the science of business management.

Ultimately, the liberal "professionals" want to make satisfaction of consumer demand the criterion of economic success. The conservative element of the "professional" intelligentsia favors the old criterion of plan fulfillment and wants to continue centralized economic administration. Both factions have adopted the computer. The conservatives, however, would use it to solve the problems of the present centralized system whereas the liberals see it as a tool to provide solutions that western economies achieve through market operations.

One subgrouping that cannot accurately be assigned to either the creative or "professional" intelligentsia but that shares certain goals in common with both groups has formed around the study of sociology, a discipline still in its infancy in the USSR. Under Khrushchev, some members of this group attained positions of considerable influence in the central committee apparatus. As party careerists, they apparently hoped to achieve reforms by working within the system. As the political pendulum has swung away from reform since 1965, however, the more visible and flamboyant of them have been quietly forced out of their central committee jobs. Several have found refuge in the academic world, particularly in the Institute for Concrete Social Research, headed by A.M. Rumyantsev, the doyen of Soviet sociology.

Like the liberal creative intelligentsia, this group puts a high premium on protection of the rights of the individual, but it also shares with the liberal "professional" intelligentsia a desire to utilize fully the expertise of specialists. The potential of the "sociologists" as a bridge between the creative and the "professional" liberals has diminished as they have lost political influence and visibility. Through Rumyantsev, a former chief editor of *Pravda*, they probably retain at least some useful contacts in the party apparatus and may yet surface again in a more hospitable political climate.

The creative and "professional" liberals have, in the main, different interests and goals. Two members of the "professional" intelligentsia, however, have publicly espoused the causes of both and represent the point at which the interests of the two groups converge. Zhores Medvedev, a biologist, and Andrey Sakharov, a physicist, are representatives of the liberal "professional" in their training, their concern for efficiency and their rejection of political-ideological interference in scientific and economic affairs. In addition, however, they share with the creative intelligentsia a deep concern for the rights of the individual. As the protests over the recent psychiatric detention of Medvedev indicate, their cohesion encourages mutual support in the face of repression.

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The more apolitical nature of the "professional" intelligentsia's position, especially among the managers and economists, is a potential threat to the unity of the disaffected intelligentsia, however. If the regime could accommodate these specialists, it is possible that many of them would desert the movement. Given the current composition of the Soviet collective leadership, such a possibility seems remote. Some of the younger leaders, such as Shelepin and Mazurov, have hinted, nevertheless, that the regime may be interested in making greater use of the specialized knowledge of this group.

The Radical Intelligentsia

Within the intelligentsia there are also radical dissidents whose aims are primarily political. These range from "removing" the present "ruling class" to restoration of capitalism or the derogation of the Communist Party's position. The radical intelligentsia appear to be drawn from diverse sections of the population, including students and the military as well as members of the creative and "professional" groupings. The radicals are unique among the disaffected intelligentsia in that they have at least one organized group, the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union and the Ukraine.

The "neo-Leninists," apparently a small fringe group, are also primarily political dissenters and thus are a part of the radical intelligentsia.



I was accustomed to consider that only what Lenin taught was correct. Therefore, when I came across a discrepancy between what Lenin wrote and what was happening in real life, I could see only one way out: go back to Lenin. But that was a mistake.

Petr Grigorenko,
during interrogation at
Serbsky Institute, Moscow,
November 1969

They want to revive the "true principles" of Leninism, which they contend have been perverted by Stalin and his successors. Their position on neo-Stalinism and by inference on efficiency places them in the company of the liberal intelligentsia. However, they would probably be less sympathetic to intellectual freedom and *glasnost* as understood by the "professional" and creative intelligentsia. If the views of Maj. General Petr Grigorenko, a former "neo-Leninist" and staunch demonstrator against re-Stalinization as well as for the Tatar cause, are representative of this group, the "neo-Leninists" are increasingly disillusioned and their potential for growth is probably diminishing.

Religious and Nationalist Dissidents

Those whose dissidence is inspired by religion or nationalism—such as the Baptists, Jews, and Tatars—are among the most vociferous and visible of the disaffected intelligentsia. They are constitutionalists, insisting that the freedom of religion and the right of the Tatars to return to their homeland in the Crimea are guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution and should be strictly observed. The impact of the religious and nationalist dissenters, potentially among the largest of the dissident groups, is diminished by the passivity of the majority. Although they support in general terms the goal of greater freedom for all, their primary concern is to secure their own freedom to pursue their specific religious and nationalist aims. This attitude removes but does not isolate them from the mainstream of dissidence.

In the polyglot USSR, nationalism has always been a potential problem and Stalin dealt ruthlessly with such "deviations." In part as a result of the collective decision-making process in the Kremlin, republic political leaders in the post-Khrushchev years have somewhat increased their maneuverability vis-a-vis the center. Some of these republic leaders in turn have given at least tacit approval to a revival of interest in local pre-Soviet history.

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The RSFSR led the way with a campaign launched in 1965 for the preservation of pre-revolutionary historical and cultural monuments, including churches. A parallel movement in the Ukraine quickly combined an appeal to Ukrainian nationalism with pressures from both the creative and critical liberals for reform of the political and economic system. Widespread arrests in 1965-66 dampened the more immediate political impact of this group, but some interest in Ukrainian pre-Soviet history continued to be countenanced by Ukrainian authorities.

In contrast, however, with Ukrainian nationalism, which served to unite the creative and "professional" liberals, Great Russian nationalism in the RSFSR found roots primarily among the conservative intelligentsia. By 1968, antagonized by the relatively internationalist ideas of *Novy Mir* and *Yunost* conservative writers grouped around *Oktyabr* and *Molodaya Gvardiya* were propounding a philosophy reminiscent of nineteenth century Slavophilism. The "new" philosophy extols the virtues of the Russian village and laments the increasing influence of Western ideas in urban areas.

*Disaffection and Repression:
Response and Counterresponse*

In the post-Khrushchev era, the collective leadership's return to a siege mentality and its deliberate, though cautious, rehabilitation of Stalin have aggravated the problem of the intel-



...you, who possibly are striving
To recover a past paradise,
You had better call Stalin—
He was a God,
He can rise.
And that he is "just around the corner"
In this world, the God-father,
Is now in evidence....

Aleksandr Tvardovsky
"By Memory" (1969)

ligentsia's disaffection. In general, the regime's response to both disaffection and dissidence has been neo-Stalinist, which is differentiated from Stalinism by the relative absence of the cult of personality and the use of selective, as opposed to pervasive, repression.

The 1965-66 trial and subsequent imprisonment of Andrey Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel for "libeling" the Soviet Union in their writings marked a turning point in terms of the attitudes of the regime and the dissidents toward each other. It raised the clear threat that similar action might be taken against others who criticized aspects of Soviet life. The threat intimidated some critics and closed off most legitimate avenues for expression of criticism. With the channels for criticism blocked off, a solid core of resolute dissidents increasingly began to resort to petition and *samizdat*—"self-publication" in the underground press—to disseminate their views. An equally important consequence of the trial has been increased disaffection among the "professional" intelligentsia who are less and less able to get a hearing for their reformist proposals. Finally, the Sinyavsky-Daniel affair politicized this disaffection by making it clear that intellectual freedom and civil rights were impossible without political safeguards. Subsequent trials in 1967 and 1968 and the arrest of Zhores Medvedev in 1970 reinforced this new attitude.

The Official Press

Conservatives find it relatively easy to publish their views in authorized journals, but liberals encounter considerable difficulty with the censor. The liberals, however, still manage to publish some unorthodox ideas by using traditionally ambiguous "Aesopian language." The Strugatsky brothers—Arkady and Boris—use this technique successfully in science fiction, which is enormously popular with workers, students, and engineers.

Soviet science fiction has evolved from a concentration on technology to a greater focus on

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sociological-philosophical themes. The genre's potential for ideological divergence is illustrated by the marked tendency of its authors to create anti-utopian—allegedly non-Communist—models of future societies. Critics of the Strugatskys' *Snail on a Slope* explicitly identified the anti-utopia it portrayed with present-day Soviet reality. The "allegedly imaginary story," contended one reviewer, "is nothing but a libel against our reality." Defending the story, *Novy Mir* retorted that it depicted a land "dominated by fear, suspicion, servility, and bureaucracy." A more recent story by the same authors, *Tale of a Troika*, was branded as "ideologically harmful" by its critics, and the chief editor of the magazine that published it was dismissed for "crass errors."

Reflecting the increasing attention being paid to science fiction, *Literary Gazette* featured a prolonged discussion of the genre in 1969 and 1970 that also related it to the present. One reviewer, from Rumyantsev's Institute of Concrete Social Research, asserted that science fiction must show the "developmental tendencies of the individual and of society in our days" and that literary critics must give it "a little more attention." A conservative contributor to the discussion, however, complained that science fiction "arbitrarily enlarges and isolates" present day (negative) phenomena, and studies them without reference to Marxism-Leninism. This is the root of the problem, inasmuch as conservatives believe that evaluating phenomena and discerning "developmental trends" are prerogatives of the party, guided by the wisdom of its special prophets.

Science fiction in the Soviet Union has long been regarded as a slightly less than respectable literary genre, as well as a politically suspect one. The *Literary Gazette* discussion suggests that it will be watched more closely in the future. It will be judged on its "social usefulness" and on its "accuracy" in reflecting Soviet reality. Yet the regime's own tendency to cite science and technology as a panacea for most ills will make it difficult to condemn the genre out of hand as Stalin did. For both the creative and "profes-

sional" liberals, science fiction provides a popular and widely read vehicle in which their ideas, disguised as fiction, may be advanced.

In the quarrel between conservatives and liberals over Russian nationalism and internationalism, the regime—simultaneously attracted and repelled by the West as well as by some Russian traditions—is similarly caught in the middle. It relies on Russian nationalism as a control mechanism and as a supplement to Soviet patriotism, but it must keep such nationalism within bounds. In September 1969 *Pravda* was forced to intervene in a conservative-liberal melee over nationalism that engaged most of the major literary journals as well as the party's prestigious bimonthly, *Kommunist*. Although *Pravda* censured both positions, its criticism of the conservative nationalists was less severe than that reserved for the liberal internationalists.

A renewed conservative assault last fall took the form of a series of "vigilance novels." Vsevolod Kochetov's *What Do You Want?* was followed in rapid succession by Ivan Shevtsov's *In the Name of the Father and the Son* and *Love and Hate*, and by Mikhail Kochnev's *Deer Ponds*.



I am for preventing and punishing any subversive work by the enemy in a socialist society and I am for suppressing any cheating and for forcing cheaters to do honest labor....

V. Kochetov,
WHAT DO YOU WANT?

Together the four novels make up a conservative's testament, attacking intellectuals in general and liberal writers and artists in particular as dupes of the West or Trotskyites. They criticized Zionism in obviously anti-Semitic tones and also attacked de-Stalinization, *Novy Mir*, and "foreign"

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influences. Shevtsov in particular exhibited crude, neo-Slavophile characteristics. On the "positive" side, they endorsed Stalin, justified collectivization and the purges, and praised the workers. There were, in fact, strong overtones of anti-intellectualism throughout the books.

The novels have all been reviewed as "timely" but have also been criticized with varying degrees of harshness for ideological and artistic inadequacies. Significantly, the reviews have ignored the sensitive themes of Stalin, the purges, and the implications of anti-Semitism.

The reception accorded Shevtsov's novels in particular illustrates the regime's ambivalence. Shevtsov is notably untalented, and he is not a member of the Writers' Union. Nevertheless, the conservative RSFSR newspaper *Sovietskaya Rossiya* praised his first novel and rebuked its critics. On 12 July, several months after the publication of his second novel, *Pravda* carried a scathing review damning the novel as "ideologically corrupt and artistically valueless." Because Shevtsov and his fellow crusaders went to extremes that even the party eschewed, the rebuke to the conservatives does not suggest an improvement in the cultural climate from the liberal intelligentsia's point of view. It does, however, illustrate the regime's recognition of the need to restrain its overly enthusiastic supporters.

Petitions and Demonstrations

Under Khrushchev, Ilya Ehrenburg and others had on occasion been forced to resort to Aesopian language to express their indignation about violations of civil rights. They at least knew, however, that they were being heard—sometimes by Khrushchev himself. Moreover, as the de-Stalinization program developed, attacks on Stalin became the most useful and indeed most potent guise under which to attack current evils. The implied reasoning ran: if Stalin did it—and he after all was a murderer—and it was wrong then, it's wrong now.

In the post-Khrushchev years, the dissidents, deprived of the Stalin symbol as a means to surface criticism, often unable to publish even in Aesopian language and increasingly convinced that the Politburo was not listening, resorted to petitions and demonstrations to express their views. Petitions are an ancient Russian tradition. Immediately after the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial in 1966, they appeared in impressive numbers and were signed by some of the most prestigious names in the Soviet intellectual world. They proliferated in 1967, making up in quantity what they were beginning to lose in the quality of the signers. By March 1968, however, it was apparent that selective regime pressures—loss of jobs, travel controls, and even the occasional imprisonment of small fry whose arrests would not cause an outcry—were having their effect. As it became evident that the authorities were not moved by either prestige or numbers, some petitions in behalf of civil rights and intellectual freedom began to be addressed to organizations outside the USSR.

Selective arrests of the organizers of public demonstrations—at best never more than a novelty on the Soviet scene—have discouraged use of this means of protest as well, especially in Moscow. There are periodic reports, however, that demonstrations do occur in the provinces.

The visibility of the demonstrators and their potential for embarrassing the regime probably accounted for the authorities' rather decisive action against them. The organizers of demonstrations have been either imprisoned or committed to insane asylums. Apparently this has had the ironic effect of increasing dissidence in prisons and camps. Anatoly Marchenko, author of *My Testimony*, was first imprisoned on nonpolitical grounds but has become an inveterate political dissident as a result of his associations in prison.

Although petitions and demonstrations have little apparent effect on the regime, they do serve to make the dissidents aware of their own

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numbers and diversity. Moreover, petitions and *samizdat* provide a means of communication upon which further dissent can feed.

The Underground Press

Reflecting the new concerns of the dissident intelligentsia, *samizdat*—the uncensored underground press—has changed significantly. Under Khrushchev, *samizdat* was dominated by the creative intelligentsia and was primarily an outlet for essentially nonpolemical works of young writers. A highly political work such as Georgy Vladimov's *The Dogs* was a relative rarity. Now, *samizdat* concentrates on such substantive issues as neo-Stalinism, political-philosophical problems, and illegal actions by the regime.

A more significant development is the publication in *samizdat* of programs outlining proposed reforms in the political-economic structure of the USSR. *Samizdat* documents are also becoming more precise, suggesting that their authors are increasingly aware that basic research is needed to provide the dissidents with factual arguments. The increasingly dispassionate, often documentary, character of *samizdat* probably reflects the growing involvement of the "professional" intelligentsia. This group apparently realizes that its highly prized, specialized knowledge does not, in the last analysis, provide a guarantee against persecution by the authorities.

One service *samizdat* performs is to give some idea of the pervasiveness of dissidence and to provide some degree of cohesion among various disaffected groups. Although no precise assessment is possible, there is some evidence to suggest that most elements of Soviet society have been affected in varying degrees, and that the number of active dissidents has increased. There are also indications that the dissident community is becoming more sophisticated and slightly more unified. Dissidents appear to be conscious of themselves as a "movement," generally referred to as "the Democratic Movement."

Khronika, an underground bimonthly published since April 1968, has evolved from a collection of incidental scraps of information on dissident activities and regime persecution into a journal with regular sections in each issue. Although it continues to provide information on trials and arrests, it now contains in addition a rather large descriptive section dealing with recent *samizdat* publications and reports on the circumstances of imprisoned dissidents.

The contents of *Khronika* indicate that the geographic and occupational distribution of its "reporters" is extremely diverse. Although the creative and "professional" intelligentsia still seem to dominate the movement, there are now more frequent reports of student and worker involvement. In addition, the success of *Khronika* and the expansion of the movement have resulted in the appearance of other journals: the *Collection of Samizdat Texts*—a bimonthly published since the fall of 1969, *The Messenger of the Ukraine*—a Ukrainian version of *Khronika* published since January, and *Exodus*. The latter, similar in form and content to *Khronika*, is apparently the organ of Soviet Zionists.

The December 1969 publication in *Khronika* of the transcript of a KGB interrogation raised the possibility that some elements of the KGB may be either dissidents or sympathetic to them, because records of interrogations are tightly held by the KGB. The recent broadcast of a taped message from Aleksandr Ginzburg similarly suggests possible KGB-MVD dissidence. The message, reportedly recorded in the camp where Ginzburg is presently serving a five-year sentence, was smuggled out of the camp and reached the West through a correspondent in Moscow. The complexity of the operation suggests at least the tacit cooperation of some authority in the camp.

Equally surprising are *samizdat* reports of dissidence in the military. In addition to the military dissidents whose names have become known in the West, such as Major General Grigorenko

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and Major Altunyan, *Khronika* has reported the arrest (May 1969) of several officers of the Baltic Fleet for organizing the Union of Struggle for Political Rights. There are also rumors that the KGB recently searched the naval and merchant marine schools and other institutes in Leningrad in search of *samizdat*, and that several arrests were made. Information on dissidence in the KGB and the military is minimal, however, and the extent of dissidence in both is probably quite small. Moreover, the regime can be expected to act especially quickly and decisively to suppress any manifestations of dissidence in these sensitive organizations.

Political Programs

As long as the dissidents lacked either a program or issues with popular appeal, the impact of the movement was limited. The relatively recent appearance of comprehensive, sophisticated political programs, advocating extensive political-economic reform of the Soviet system, has helped to remedy this situation. Sakharov's 1968 essay on the faults of Soviet society and on his hopes for cooperation between socialist and capitalist countries apparently stimulated the search for a realistic alternative to the present system.

The Program of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine and the Baltics is a radical one, advocating reform from below. Allegedly drafted in part by officers of the Baltic Fleet in early 1969, it advocates civil liberties, a democratic state, an end to Soviet colonialism, political pluralism, withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, reunification of Germany, and the end of party control over literature and intellectual life. The program declares that the struggle against capitalism is "criminal and futile," and advocates a mixed economy regulated by the market.

In March 1970 another program appeared in the form of a letter to the Politburo troika. Sakharov, Valentin Turchin, and Roy Medvedev, the authors, advocate extensive political and eco-

nomie reform and full democratization of Soviet life. They appeal for intellectual freedom, free public discussion of issues (*glasnost*), free exchange of ideas with Western colleagues and an end of the party's total domination of Soviet society. They also reiterate Sakharov's 1958 theme of the future convergence of capitalist and socialist societies. In contrast with the Democratic Program, Sakharov and his colleagues suggest that the party carry out this reform over a period of four to five years to avoid confusion. In this sense, their program is the more moderate. Assigning a transitional role to the party may represent an attempt to make the reform palatable. Nevertheless, the compromise does suggest a willingness characteristic of the "professional" intelligentsia to work within the system. If the reform is not carried out, the authors contend that the Soviet Union "will fall behind capitalist countries and gradually be transformed into a second-rate provincial power."

Of the two programs, the Sakharov-Turchin-Medvedev one is probably more acceptable to the liberal intelligentsia. Its moderate, pragmatic tone, clearly illustrated by its proposals for economic reform, reflects the attitude of the liberal "professional" intelligentsia. At the same time, its concern for individual human rights would appeal to the creative intelligentsia. *Samizdat* appears to circulate slowly, however, even among the intelligentsia, and the program has not yet achieved wide popularity.

The Regime's Control Techniques

Repression of disaffection and of dissidence has been both bold and subtle. Selective purges of liberal editorial boards have made it increasingly difficult for liberals to publish their works in approved media. Within the last year, the editorial boards of several liberal journals in the center have been purged.

The purges have also reached the provincial and local press, which often served as outlets for writers of liberal inclination. In recent months,

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several local journals have been criticized for "shortcomings" and for publishing "shallow" material.

Trials of dissidents in the provinces or more remote regions, where the potential for embarrassing publicity in the West is greatly minimized, have replaced the Moscow "show trials" of the mid-60s. Although even these "public" trials were closed, *Khronika* reports that the authorities are now holding some trials *in camera*.

With increasing frequency dissidents are being sent to psychiatric institutes rather than being dealt with in the courts. In December, *Khronika* reported that ambulances are kept near a number of Moscow offices where someone is likely to protest or otherwise criticize the regime. Psychiatric hospitals, apparently administered by the MVD and run jointly with the KGB, exist in Kazan, Leningrad, Minsk, Sychevka, Chernyakovsk and Moscow (Serbsky Institute).

This approach avoids the publicity of a prolonged trial and leaves the regime with more options. The length of sentence is never specified in a psychiatric case. Consequently, if the regime should be pressed to release a "patient," a new

Less sensational methods have also been used to intimidate the dissenters. Dissident members of the party are expelled. Other dissidents have been fired or demoted, forcing at least some well-educated individuals to take menial jobs. Although the recent resurgence of antiparasite (vagrancy) laws is not specifically aimed at the dissidents, it may have the effect of adding yet another charge under which they may be prosecuted. In addition, foreign travel is impossible, and contacts with Western colleagues, even by mail, are restricted. Such harassment rarely results in recantation but probably deters the less committed from joining the dissenters.

Politically reliable individuals and professional organizations, such as the Writers' Union, are also used in the struggle against nonconformists. Ostensibly acting on charges brought by one of its members, the Ryazan branch of the RSFSR Writers' Union expelled Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn from the Union in November. *Khronika* however reports that the decision to expel Solzhenitsyn actually was made at higher party levels. The *Novy Mir* purge, also carried out by the Union, no doubt was initiated or approved by high party officials.

The December plenary meeting of the Boards of the Creative Union found manifestations of "harmful" or "unhealthy" tendencies in every creative field. Sergey Mikhalkov, First Secretary of the Moscow Writers' Union, censured "ideologically immature writers who are playing into the hands of socialism's enemies" and warned that there is "no room in the Soviet writers' milieu for bountiful and all-forgiving liberalism." Petr Demichev, candidate member of the Politburo and secretary for ideology and culture, repeated the standard refrains on the ideological struggle and rejected the Western idea of ideological pluralism. According to Demichev, writers may criticize indiscipline, drunkenness, and similar burning issues. World War II, collectivization, and industrialization, however—all part of the Stalin era—are not suitable subjects for critical treatment. This meeting apparently was called to inform the Unions that some



The incarceration of free-thinking, healthy people in madhouses is spiritual murder...a fiendish and prolonged torture....

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn,
on the arrest of Zhores
Medvedev, June 1970

examination producing the desired declaration of sanity can be ordered. The thin facade of government noninvolvement, however, is thereby preserved. The Medvedev case, in which the declaration of insanity ("pathological psychopathy") was quickly reversed, is an example.

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housecleaning was necessary. No solutions were forthcoming, but the delegates unanimously adopted a resolution pledging to "honor" their "civic duty."

Outlook

The leadership's inability to solve its domestic problems—particularly economic inefficiency and loss of zeal in the pursuit of Communism—confronts it with a virtual dilemma. It recognizes the need for the specialized skills and knowledge of the intelligentsia in dealing with the increasingly complex socioeconomic structure of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the party is reluctant to turn to the intelligentsia for solutions because this would dilute its decision-making monopoly. The regime is confronted with a vicious cause-effect cycle: the frustration and disaffection of the intelligentsia breed dissidence, which leads to repression, which triggers even greater dissidence. The regime can cope with dissidence, but it has found only temporary solutions to disaffection in buying off individuals. The attempt to rekindle enthusiasm and creativity through propaganda has not been notably successful.

Inasmuch as the authorities have demonstrated their ability to cope with dissidence, one feasible explanation for their failure to suppress it completely is that it is not regarded as a threat to the stability of the system. Like the dissidents, the leadership may be aware of the parallels between the present situation and the last decades of Imperial Russia. If so both probably recognize that the fundamental weakness of the dissidents is their failure to attract a popular following. The traditional and basic distrust that exists between the intelligentsia and the masses and the regime's subtle manipulation of this distrust will make it difficult for the dissidents to attract widespread support. Thus, the regime's apparent indecisiveness may in fact represent a decision to tolerate some protests on the theory that they act as a

"safety valve," deterring the dissidents from more "serious" activities.

Another, more plausible explanation—one apparently held by some dissidents—is that the elite itself is wary of unleashing the KGB. If, as *Khronika* suggests, varying degrees of dissidence have affected most elements of Soviet society, complete suppression of unorthodox attitudes would probably necessitate purges reminiscent of the Stalin era, in scope if not in numbers. The elite, then, probably fears that terror, once unleashed, may again come full circle and consume its instigators. Another manifestation of this attitude is the collective leadership's interest in preventing any one individual from concentrating too much power in his own hands.

The regime at this juncture has no obvious reason for deep concern over dissidence. In the first place, developments in recent years suggest that the movement is becoming more openly political but not actually revolutionary. Secondly, the dissidents lack a mass following or support at high levels within the "system." So long as this situation continues, the regime probably will tolerate a degree of dissidence and content itself with "warnings" of varying degrees of severity. Should a transformation occur, however, in which the dissidents had both the inclination and the ability to create a mass, or a revolutionary, movement, the regime would move rapidly and decisively to suppress all dissidence. The price of resolute repression may be a "technological gap," but the leadership may be willing to accept this. In such a situation, moreover, the leadership would probably also accept the risk of unleashing the KGB.

A shift in the leadership, resulting either in a more liberal or a more conservative outlook, could change the present situation in a number of ways. Regardless of what changes occur, however, it is most unlikely that any manifestation of revolutionary dissidence will be tolerated.

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